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CPLR Article 75 or the Federal Arbitration Act:
Which One Applies to Arbitrations in New
York and Why It Matters
BoAz S. MORAG AND KATIE GONZALEZ*

I.

Introduction

For nearly a century, New York has been a center for arbitration, both
domestic and international, owing in large part to its long-standing history
of judicial support for arbitration through New York's arbitration law,
Article 75 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (Article 75). 1 Indeed,
Article 75 predates the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)2 and was the
model for the FAA. Given this historical encouragement of arbitration, New
York remains a favored seat for international arbitrations. In a recent survey
of practitioners for the seat most often chosen for international arbitrations,
New York was the only United States forum that made the top seven fora
chosen as a seat for international arbitrations. 3 New York's role in
commerce likewise makes it a natural situs for non-international
4
arbitrations.
As practitioners know, the situs of an arbitration is critical because it is the
arbitration law of the situs that, absent an explicit agreement to the contrary,
provides the lex arbitri-thelaw that determines among other issues under
what circumstances a court will compel arbitration, supervise the arbitration
proceedings, and vacate an award issued in that seat.5 Where an arbitration
* The authors are a Counsel and an Associate, respectively, in the Litigation and Arbitration
practice at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. Mr. Morag is a Member of the New York
City Bar Association's International Commercial Disputes Committee ("ICDC") and an
Affiliate Member of its Arbitration Committee. The authors are indebted to Summer Associate
Morgan Miller for her invaluable research and drafting assistance and to Richard L. Mattiaccio,
Chair of the ICDC, and to Steve Skulnik, Chair of the Arbitration Committee, for their
thoughtful comments. The views expressed in this article reflect those of the authors and not
necessarily those of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP or any of its clients.

1. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7501 7515 (McKinney 2018).
2. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 16, 201 208, 301 307 (1947).
3. 2018 InternationalArbitration Survey: The Evolution of InternationalArbitration, WHITE &

1, 9 (last visited Feb. 5, 2019), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/
2018 -International -Arbitration- Survey -The-Evolution-of-International-Arbitration.pdf.
4. Press Release, Rekha Rangachari, N.Y. Int'l Arbitration Ctr., N.Y.C. Maintains Lead As
The Favored U.S. Arbitral Seat, (May 18, 2018), https://gallery.mailchimp.com/95f3ab83655de
165578b57965/files/d792ca4d- 19c9-448c-b490-1076a246cb5f/2018.05.18_NYIACPressRe
leaseNewYorkCityMaintainsLead As The FavoredU.S._ArbitralSeat.02.pdf.
5. Gonzalo Vial, Influence of the Arbitral Seat in the Outcome of an International
Commercial Arbitration, 50 INT'L LAW. 329, 334 (2017).
CASE
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is sited in the United States-more specifically in New York-the United
States' federal system results in both federal and New York state law playing
a role in an arbitration conducted here.6 Indeed, for an entirely local dispute
that does not involve interstate commerce, New York's Article 75 is the sole
source of arbitration law to govern such a proceeding.7
But New York arbitration law also can play a role-and its terms are,
therefore, relevant for practitioners and parties alike-when arbitration in
New York is agreed to in order to resolve disputes over transactions
involving interstate commerce between entirely domestic parties, and when
there is an international component to the transaction that subjects the
agreement to arbitrate and the resulting award to the terms of the New York
Convention or the Panama Convention. 8 In both domestic and
international circumstances, the United States Supreme Court has construed
the FAA and the architecture of the New York and Panama Conventions
potentially to make New York law applicable, rather than preempted.9 For
one, New York arbitration law plays a "gap filler" role on procedural issues
not addressed by the FAA.10 But even more importantly, depending on how
the parties draft their contracts, courts have found parties to have agreed to
arbitrate under New York's arbitration law (rather than under the FAA's
provisions)," an option that the United States Supreme Court has held is
consistent with the FAA, not preempted by it.12
As this article explains beginning with Part I, New York courts have found
an intention to arbitrate under New York State's arbitration law based on the
language of the parties' arbitration clause as well as the wording of the
choice-of-law clause that identifies the law that governs the interpretation of
6. Jeremy Wilson & William Lowery, Arbitration in New York, in 1 CMS GUIDE
ARBITRATION

TO

519, 521 (2012), https://eguides.cmslegal.com/pdf/arbitration-volumeI/CMS /

20GtAVolo20I_NEWo20YORK.pdf.
7. Stephen L. Brodsky, NavigatingFederaland State Law in a NYArbitration, N.Y. L. J. (Aug.
2, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/08/02/navigating-federal-and-state-

law-in-a-ny-arbitration/?printer-friendly/.
8. The "New York Convention" refers to the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,

reprinted in Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1947) (historical and statutory notes) to
which the United States and over 145 countries are signatories. The "Panama Convention"
refers to the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of January

30, 1975, 101 Stat. 448, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245, to which the United States and 18 Latin American
countries are signatories. The New York Convention and Panama Convention apply to
international disputes including when the arbitration is held in the United States. Bergesen v.

Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).
9. See Brodsky, supra note 7.

10. Id.
11. See Wilson & Lowery, supra note 6, at 527 28.
12. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989) (holding that the California Arbitration Act is not preempted by the FAA where parties
were found to have agreed that their arbitration agreement would be governed by California
arbitration law).
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13
the contract, even where such clause makes no reference to arbitration.
Accordingly, it is important for anyone contemplating entering into an
agreement to arbitrate in New York to understand how Article 75 operates
and the ways in which a party may be found to have manifested the intention
to adopt New York arbitration law. Because parties can find themselves
bound by Article 75 without subjectively intending that result, this article
offers drafting tips to avoid the unintended consequence of adopting Article
75 to apply to an arbitration that the lawyers and parties might have believed
was, and intended to be, governed by the FAA alone in a domestic case, or
solely by the FAA and New York or Panama Conventions in an international
arbitration.
In Part II, we provide background on the historical similarities and
divergences between the FAA and Article 75, dating back to their enactment
nearly a century ago, as well as recent attempts to amend Article 75 with the
potential to create an even greater variance between New York state and
federal law. Part III, then, summarizes the current differences between the
FAA and the provisions of Article 75 as construed by the courts in New York.
Part IV identifies the rules that determine whether an agreement to arbitrate
in New York is subject to the FAA, Article 75, or both by first identifying the
conditions that trigger the applicability of the FAA, and second discussing
how the FAA authorizes parties to agree to arbitrate under state arbitration
laws.
Part V explains the two methods by which courts in New York have found
parties to have manifested the intention to have the standards of Article 75
(rather than those of the FAA) apply to their arbitration. Part V closes with
a discussion of the circumstances under which certain procedural provisions
of Article 75 apply to an arbitration, otherwise governed by the FAA, where
the FAA is silent, and Article 75 provides a procedural gap filler rule.
In Part VI, the article turns to the effect that the parties' choice of a set of
institutional arbitration rules, such as those promulgated by the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), International Centre for Dispute Resolution
(ICDR), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), JAMS, the
International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR)
(collectively, Institutional Arbitration Rules), has on the foregoing analysis
and how this choice interacts with the separate choice to have New York
arbitration law play a role in the proceedings.
Finally, in Part VII, we offer some suggestions to practitioners and
parties-equally applicable to international and domestic arbitrations sited
in New York-regarding the drafting of the choice-of-law clause and, in
particular, the arbitration agreement, so as to avoid unanticipated
consequences that can result from inattention to the inter-relationship
between these provisions when parties elect New York law and decide to
arbitrate in New York.

13. See Wilson & Lowery, supra note 6, at 527 28.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
268

II.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 52, NO. 2

Background

As a threshold matter, both the FAA and Article 75, particularly as
construed by the courts over the last thirty-five years, reflect a common
policy strongly favoring arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism,
advanced by rigorous judicial enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate
commercial disputes and the resulting arbitral award. 14 Indeed, when
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to eliminate judicial hostility to the
enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate, 15 its drafters modeled the
new federal legislation on New York's 1920 Law of Arbitration, now codified
in Article 75.16 At that time, New York was the only state that had adopted
legislation which broadly enforced arbitration agreements. 17 But in enacting
the FAA, Congress consciously chose to vary certain of the federal statute's
provisions, as compared to the New York statute, giving rise from the outset
to the possibility of potentially different outcomes. 8
Accordingly, as set out below, variations have existed between New York
state practice under Article 75 and federal practice under the FAA dating
back to 1925.19 Other variations have developed since as to: (i) the
delegation of responsibility for first-instance determination of certain issues
as between a court and the arbitrators; (ii) certain procedures governing the
conduct of the arbitration; and (iii) the precise formulation of the standards
under which a court may determine not to enforce an award.20 In practice,
however, these distinctions have not proven to date to be outcome
determinative. In other words, the determination that the FAA applies
rather than Article 75 or vice versa has not resulted in a given award issued
in New York being found to be enforceable under one regime but
14. See id. at 525; see also Caitlin J. Halligan & Gabriel K. Gillett, New York Courts at the
Forefront of Arbitration Law, L.A. DAILY J. (June 24, 2016), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wpcontentluploads/documents/publications/Halligan-Gillett-New-York-Courts-at-the-Forefrontof-Arbitration-Law-DJ -6 -24-16.pdf.

15. Wilson & Lowery, supra note 6, at 521.
16. Halligan & Gillett, supra note 14.
17. See H.H. Nordlinger, The Law and PracticeofArbitration in New York, 13 Mo. L. REV. 196,

196 97 (1948). New York was also an early adopter of legislation permitting the judicial
enforcement of expert determinations in a similar manner as arbitration awards and

incorporating the procedures of Article 75. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7601 ("A special proceeding
may be commenced to specifically enforce an agreement that a question of valuation, appraisal
or other issue or controversy be determined by a person named or to be selected. The court
may enforce such an agreement as if it were an arbitration agreement, in which case the

proceeding shall be conducted as if brought under article seventy-five of this chapter."). For a
more complete discussion of Section 7601 and its role in facilitating this additional and now

commonplace method of dispute resolution, particularly in M&A transactions, see N.Y.C.
AsS'N, PURCHASE PRICE ADJUSTMENT

CLAUSES AND EXPERT DETERMINATIONS:

ISSUES, PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS

BAR

LEGAL

38 41 (2013).

18. Brodsky, supra note 7.
19. See id.
20. An Arbitration Primerfor Litigators, N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N 1, 8 9 (2015), https://www.nysba
.org/Sections/DisputeResolution/DisputeResolutionPDFs/AnArbitrationPrimer For Lit
igators.html.
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unenforceable under the other.21 But there are exceptions in result with
respect to court decisions regarding the consolidation of arbitration
proceedings22 and as to awards that include an assessment of punitive
damages, attorneys' fees, or both.23
21. See, e.g., Cty. of Nassau v. Chase, 402 F. App'x 540, 542 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that
although the New York law standard, and not the different federal law standard, for vacating an
arbitral award applied, the Court "agree[d] with the District Court that the arbitral award must
be confirmed."); Cardinale v. 267 Sixth Street LLC, No. 13 Civ. 4845 JFK), 2014 VL
4799691, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2014) (declining to determine whether vacatur or
modification was governed by the FAA or New York state law as under both, petition must be
denied); TiVo, Inc. v. Goldwasser, No. 12 Civ. 7142 (LLS), 2013 NVL 586856, at *2 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013) (declining to resolve dispute whether the FAA or New York law
governed where "the award must be confirmed whether reviewed under New York state law, or
the standard required by the FAA."); Harper Ins. Ltd. v. Century Indem. Co., 819 F. Supp. 2d
270, 274 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("The parties dispute whether New York's Civil Practice Law
('CPLR') ... or the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (FAA'), should apply to this
petition. This question has potentially significant consequences because if the CPLR applies,
the petition is likely time-barred ... [Vie ultimately conclude that regardless of the governing
law or whether the petition should be dismissed on equitable or limitations grounds, LMCs
have not met their substantive burden for demonstrating that the arbitrators acted outside the
scope of their authority. Therefore, we do not address the myriad choice-of-law and procedural
matters raised by the parties and simply hold that, assuming the petition has been properly
brought to this Court, it is insufficient to warrant vacatur."); 'Wien & Malkin LLP v. HelmsleySpear, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 471 (N.Y. 2006) (on remand from the United States Supreme Court,
confirming an award under the FAA that had previously been confirmed under CPLR 7511);
Mahn v. Major, Lindsey & Africa, LLC, 74 N.Y.S.3d 7, 7 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) ("The
matter involved interstate commerce, and was thus governed by the terms of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) ... not the standard set forth in CPLR 751 (b). Nevertheless, since the
requirements for vacatur of an arbitration award are nearly identical under the FAA and CPLR
7511, the result remains the same and the award was properly confirmed.") (internal citation
omitted); Roberts v. Finger, No. 602657, 2007 VL 1093487, at *6(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 2007)
("In this case, it does not appear that the FAA and the CPLR standards applicable to the judicial
review of an arbitration award conflict.").
22. The FAA and Article 75 differ on under what circumstances a court can consolidate
multiple arbitrations into one proceeding. In In re Cohen v. S.A. C. CapitalAdvisors, LLC, the
court considered whether it could invoke New York arbitral rules and consolidate the
proceedings in the interest of efficiency, or whether, applying the FAA, it would only be
permitted to consolidate if the parties explicitly agreed to consolidation in their arbitration
agreement. In re Cohen v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, LLC, 815 N.Y.S.2d 493, at *5 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cty. 2006). This issue is indicative of one in which the outcome of an arbitration could be
different if Article 75 applied. 'While consolidation may not ultimately affect the case's
outcome, consolidation may have an impact on arbitration procedure that inevitably impacts a
case's resolution.
23. See Kudler v. Truffelman, 941 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (reversing
determination that FAA applied because the parties' medical practice partnership agreement
"did not involve interstate commerce," and thus "the award of punitive damages was improper"
under New York arbitration law), leave to appeal denied, 19 N.Y.3d 815 (2012); see also CIT
Project Fin., L.L.C. v. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, No. 600847/03, 2004 VL 2941331, at
*5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 17, 2004) (refusing to confirm portion of arbitration award that granted
attorneys' fees).
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On the other hand, courts in New York have gone out of their way to set
out rules as to when the FAA applies and when the parties have chosenconsistent with the FAA-to still have New York state arbitration law
govern. 24 Thus, it is conceivable that in the future, one of the several
variations between state and federal rules could affect whether a dispute is
arbitrated and the enforceability of the resulting award.
Moreover, through the years, various amendments to Article 75 have been
proposed, some to further align New York arbitration law with federal law
and others to differentiate to an even greater extent New York from federal
law.25 Thus, a 2007 proposal to replace the current Article 75 with the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act26 would have reconciled New York law
with the provisions of the FAA. More recently, a much different bill has
been proposed that would heighten the variations between the state and
federal law governing arbitrations conducted in New York.27 The bill
proposes amending Article 75 to require arbitral awards to "state the issues
in dispute and contain the arbitrator's findings of fact and conclusions of
law," to require all arbitrators to be "neutral third-party arbitrator[s],"28 and
to prohibit challenging an arbitrator until the eve of the arbitration
hearing.29 The proposed amendment would also adopt the federal "manifest
disregard of the law" test-a test that has never been employed by the New
York Court of Appeals-to the existing statutory standards of judicial review
of arbitral awards in Article 75.30 It is unclear whether this amendment is
intended to add grounds for challenging an award or to replace the
"irrationality" standard the New York appellate courts have been using for
years. 31 The consideration of these proposals, particularly ones that would
24. Wilson & Lowery, supra note 6, at 527.
25. See, e.g., Opposition to Proposed Changes to NYS Business-to-BusinessArbitration, N.Y.C. BAR,
(May 17, 2018), https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reportslisting/reports/detail/opposition-to-proposed-changes -to-nys-business -to-business -arbitrationproceedings.
26. N.Y. State Assemb., A07826, 2007 2008 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
27. N.Y. State Assemb., A10393, 2018 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). In addition, a 2019 bill
proposes to amend Article 75 by authorizing the vacatur of an arbitration award on the basis of
manifest disregard of the law. N.Y. State Assemb., S.B. 2396, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y.

2019).
28. A mandate of party-appointed arbitrator neutrality as a matter of New York law would
expressly conflict with the Second Circuit's recent decision in Certain UnderwritingMembers of
Lloyds of London v. Florida, Dep't of FinancialServces, which held party-appointed arbitrators are
not subject to the same standard are neutral arbitrators, and a conflict involving the former may
establish evident partiality only when it satisfies the higher standard of demonstrating that an
undisclosed relationship between the opposing party and its appointed arbitrator violates any
contractual requirement of "disinterestedness or ha[s] a prejudicial impact on the award" and
must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Certain Underwriting Members of Lloyds of
London v. Florida, Dep't of Fin. Servs. 892 F.3d 501, 510 11 (2d Cir. 2018).
29. N.Y. State Assemb., A.905-C, 2017 2018 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).
30. See id.
31. See DANA MAcGRATH & RICHARD L. MATTACCiO, REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE
ARBITRATION COMMITTEE AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES COMMITTEE 2

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2019]

CPLR ARTICLE 75

271

exacerbate variances between Article 75 and the FAA, presents an occasion
to review those existing differences, and consequently, the circumstances
under which, in an arbitration sited in New York, Article 75 applies either as
a mere "gap filler" in the face of FAA silence or as a substitute to the FAA
entirely.
It thus remains important to appreciate the distinctions between the FAA
and Article 75 and, even more significantly, how each regime is triggered.32
As established below, although parties are free and encouraged by
arbitration practitioners and authors to specify explicitly which set of rules
between the FAA and Article 75 that they want to govern their arbitrations,
the case law and experience demonstrate that many contract drafters, and
presumably many more parties, are unaware that they can end up with
Article 75 playing a far greater role than they ever expected. This is not
because of how the arbitration clause is written, but because of the words
chosen in a separate choice-of-law clause. 33 If enacted, proposed
amendments to Article 75 could have a material impact if contracting parties
use language in their arbitration agreement that is subject to being
interpreted by New York courts as a choice of New York arbitration law to
govern their disputes. The risk, perhaps remote, but certainly real, that
New York may enact Article 75 amendments that are inconsistent with
international arbitration principles-notably, the very basic principle of
party autonomy-places in high relief the need for careful drafting of
arbitration agreements so that they clearly reflect the intent of the parties.
III.

Differences between the FAA and Article 75

The table below identifies the issues on which the FAA and Article 75
differ-either explicitly, by having been construed to adopt conflicting rules,
or implicitly, where the FAA is silent on an issue addressed by Article 75:
(2018) (noting that the amendment's provisions "risk disrupting long-established arbitration
practices and could introduce considerable uncertainty in the resolution of numerous businessto-business disputes in New York."); see also Daesang Corp. v. NutraSweet Co., No. 655019/16,
2018 NVL 4623562, *1 n.1 (App. Div. Sept. 27, 2018) (citing the anicus curiae brief submitted by
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which cautioned that "[any suggestion that
New York courts will review the arbitrators' factual and legal determinations, as if on appeal,...
will discourage parties from choosing New York as the place of arbitration.").
32. These questions have periodically been a subject of interest to institutional actors and
groups, such as the New York State Bar Association and the New York City Bar Association. See
Mark Bunim, Arbitrationsin New York: The FederalArbitrationAct vs. the CPLR, LINKEDIN, (June
29, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/arbitrations-new-york-federal-arbitration-act-vscplr-mark-bunim/; see also The Interaction Between the CPLR and the Federal Arbitration Act:
Which One Applies and When?, N.Y. CTY. LAW. ASS'N, (June 19, 2014), http://www.nycla.org/

PDF/The %20Interaction%20Between%20the%20CPLR20and%20the%20Federal%2OAr
bitration%20Act%20-%2006.19.14.pdf
33. The Article 75 reform proposals currently under consideration should not have any
impact, if enacted, on international arbitrations seated in New York precisely because of their
inconsistency with the FAA, so long as the parties have not adopted Article 75 as their lex arbitri.
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Under Article 75
The court decides whether the claim
was timely filed under the relevant
statute of limitations.34
"Before hearing any testimony, an
arbitrator shall be sworn to hear
and decide the controversy faithfully
and fairly by an officer authorized to
administer an oath," subject to
written waiver or waiver by
continuing with the arbitration
without objection.36
An attorney of record in the
arbitration, in addition to an
arbitrator,
may
subpoena
witnesses.3
The court will resolve a challenge to
the parties' entire contract for
reason related to illegality.40

[VOL. 52, NO. 2

I

*I

Under the FAA
The arbitrator decides whether the
claim was timely filed under the
relevant statute of limitations.35
There is no requirement that an
arbitrator take an oath.3

An arbitrator
witnesses.

may

subpoena

An arbitrator will resolve a challenge
to the parties' entire contract (as
opposed to the arbitration clause
itself) for
reason related to
41
illegality.
The court may order consolidation The court is not permitted to
of multiple arbitrations if it finds it consolidate multiple arbitrations,
would be efficient.42
absent an explicit agreement from
the parties.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

43

N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7502(b), 7503 (McKinney 2018).
Howsam v. Dean YVitter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7506(a), (f) (emphasis added).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 16 (1947).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7505.
9 U.S.C. § 7.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 762 N.Y.S.2d 730, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
In re Cohen, 2006 WL 399766, at *4 5.
Id. at *4 (citing cases).
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A court may use its equitable powers A court may not disqualify an
to disqualify an arbitrator for bias arbitrator
during
arbitration
and
suspend
the
arbitration proceedings.4"
proceedings until the parties appoint
a new arbitrator.44
A party waives its right to arbitrate An arbitrator decides issues
of
47
waiver of rights to arbitrate.
by manifesting "an affirmative
46
acceptance of the judicial process.,
The party resisting arbitration has The moving party to a motion to
the burden of showing that compel arbitration has the burden of
41
arbitration is inappropriate.4
proving arbitration is proper. 41
The parties may seek a stay or any The parties may not seek judicial
other judicial relief at any time. 0
relief until after the final award is
issued,
once
an
arbitration
commences.51

44. See, e.g., Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr. v. Signature Med. Mgmt. Grp., L.L.C., 775 N.Y.S.2d
279, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
45. See Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia, 443 F. Supp. 386,
387 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("No section of the [FAA] ... provides for judicial scrutiny of an
arbitrator's qualifications in any proceeding other than an action to confirm or vacate an award.
If Congress had wished to authorize such review before arbitration proceedings commence, it
could have easily so provided."); see also Sanko S.S. Co. v. Cook Industries, Inc., 495 F.2d 1260,
1264 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973) ("In such cases, a refusal by the panel to compel an allegedly partial
arbitrator to step down will generally be reviewable by a district court only after an award has
been made.").
46. Volpe v. Interpublic Grp. of Cos., Inc., No. 652308/2012, 2013 VL 3989040, at *4 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Co. Aug. 2, 2013) (quoting Braun Equip. Co. Inc. v. Meli Borelli Assocs., 632
N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)).
47. Id. at *3.
48. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7503(c) (McKinney 2018).
49. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947).
50. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7502(c); Sierra USA Commc'ns, Inc. v. Int'l Tel. & Satellite Corp., 824
N.Y.S.2d 560, 564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
51. 9 U.S.C. § 16.
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'I M;
Under Article 75
Under the FAA
An arbitrator may not award An arbitrator may award punitive
punitive damages.52
damages.53
An arbitrator may not award An arbitrator may award attorneys'
attorneys' fees to the prevailing fees to the prevailing party."
party, unless provided for in the
arbitration
agreement
or an
applicable statute."
"The court, on application, may The court is not given discretion to
reduce or disallow any fee or review an award's assessment of any
expense it finds excessive or allocate fee or expense."
it as justice requires. 56
An arbitral award must be written, Silent as to how an arbitration award
signed, and affirmed by the must be delivered.60
arbitrator within a fixed time by
agreement or court order.5
An
arbitrator must deliver copies of the
award to the parties. 9
An award may be vacated for Silent on whether an award may be
"failure to follow the procedure" of vacated 2 for failure to follow FAA
Article 75, "unless the party applying procedure.63
to vacate the award continued with
the arbitration with notice of
the
1
I

defect and without objection.'

52. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 356 (N.Y. 1976) ("An arbitrator has no power
to award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the parties ....

Since enforcement of an

award of punitive damages as a purely private remedy would violate strong public policy, an
arbitrator's award which imposes punitive damages should be vacated.").
53. In re Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC v. Weiss, 122 A.D.3d 51, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
54. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7513 (McKinney 2018).
55. PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir. 1996).

56. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7513 (emphasis added).
57. Unless the losing party can otherwise satisfy vacatur standards of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4),
there is no basis for challenging the amount of fees or category of expense awarded.
58. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7507.
59. Id.
60. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 16 (1947).
61. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1)(iv) (McKinney 2018).
62. While the FAA and Article 75 have seemingly similar standards for judging the vacatur of
arbitral awards, there are inconsistencies in the application of both statutes' grounds. Compare 9
U.S.C. § 10 with N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511. For example, while the FAA (like N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 7511) articulates four grounds for vacating an award, courts applying the FAA may consider
an additional "manifest disregard of the law" standard for determining whether vacatur is
appropriate. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
63. See 9 U.S.C. § 10.
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"[T]he appearance of impropriety
may be a sufficient or critical factor
in vacating arbitration awards."64
An arbitral award may be confirmed
within one year from the date the
award was delivered to the losing
party by the prevailing party."
The deadline to move the court to
vacate or modify an award is within
ninety days after the award was
delivered to any party.6
Courts can decide if an arbitration
has a res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect barring a second
arbitration between the same parties
and concerning related claims.
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"'Appearance of impropriety' may
not be sufficient to vacate" an
arbitral award."
An arbitral award may be confirmed
within one year from the date of
the award.6
The deadline to give notice of a
motion to vacate or modify an award
is "within three months after the
award is filed or delivered."69
The arbitrator or arbitral tribunal
will decide if an arbitration has a res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect
barring a second arbitration between
the parties and concerning related
claims.

IV. Applicability of the FAA, Article 75, or Both
When the seat of an arbitration is New York, which set of rules applies?
The FAA, Article 75, or both? We start by noting that the answer to this
question is not provided by legal doctrines that, in other contexts, offer a
bright line answer to whether federal law governs rather than state law. For
example, whether the state rules under Article 75 or federal rules under the
FAA apply to any given issue is not answered by the forum in which the
dispute is pending. This is because certain provisions of the FAA have been
held to be "substantive" and are thus applicable in state as well as federal
court; others have been deemed procedural and are thought to apply only in
64. United House of Prayer for All People of the Church on the Rock of Apostolic Faith v.
L.M.A. Int'l, Ltd., 107 F. Supp. 2d 227, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing In reJ.P. Stevens & Co.,
Inc. v. Rytex Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 123, 126 (N.Y. 1974)) (emphasis added).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7510 (McKinney 2018); Siegel v. Landy, 944 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2012) (finding an arbitral award vacated where the arbitrator did not follow the
procedures set forth in Article 75 and failed to allow a hearing on whether the statute of
limitations had run).
67. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1947).
68. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511.
69. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (emphasis added).
70. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7503(b); see In re Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 979 N.Y.S.2d 910, 910
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
71. See Citicorp, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., 776 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2015).
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federal court. 72 At the same time, however, despite creating some
"substantive" federal law with respect to arbitration, the FAA "is something
of an anomaly in the realm of federal legislation: It bestows no federal
jurisdiction but rather requires for access to a federal forum an independent
jurisdictional basis over the parties' dispute."73 Thus, before a district court
may entertain a petition under the FAA, there must be an independent basis
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, New York state courts are often the ones called
upon to apply the FAA when the citizenship of the parties or the underlying
dispute does not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in federal
court. Conversely, the federal courts in New York often invoke the
provisions of Article 75 in ruling on arbitration issues, even with respect to
arbitration agreements governed by the FAA. Thus, the court in which
litigants find themselves does not necessarily determine which rules apply.
A.

DOES THE FAA APPLY?

Then how does one know which sets of arbitration rules applies? The
first step in the analysis is to determine whether the agreement to arbitrate is
subject to the FAA. The FAA dictates that a "written provision in . .. a

contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 74 The Supreme Court has
held that the term "involving commerce" in the FAA is the functional

72. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6
(1989) ("we have held that the FAA's 'substantive' provisions §§ 1 and 2 are applicable in state
as well as federal court").
73. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009); see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947) ("A party
aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28 ...").
74. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA itself contains one exemption to its coverage for arbitration
agreements in "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The Supreme Court has
explained that this exclusion was not adopted so arbitrations in that sphere would be governed
by state law, but rather because at the time of the FAA's adoption, other existing or anticipated
federal legislation already governed or would shortly govern arbitrations involving those
workers. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118 19 (2001). In New
Prime Inc. v.Oliveira, the Supreme Court held that a court rather than an arbitrator is required
to determine whether the FAA's section 1 exemption applies, despite any agreement by the
parties to have arbitrators decide that issue. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. (2019) (slip
op., at 4).
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equivalent of "affecting commerce,"71 which typically signals Congress's
76
intent to invoke the full extent of its powers under the Commerce Clause.
In determining whether a transaction sufficiently affects interstate
commerce, courts are not constrained by the parties' ex ante intentions in
entering into the contract or their contemplated intra-state activity; rather,
they assess whether the transaction in fact had some effect on interstate
commerce. 77 This ex post analysis has led courts to consider such factors as
the nature of the parties' business, 78 where the parties reside or companies
are headquartered, 79 and from which states the materials, equipment, and
services used in the project were obtained.so
More recently, the Supreme Court explained that "the FAA encompasses a
wider range of transactions than those actually 'in commerce'-that is,
'within the flow of interstate commerce.' "81 Thus, it is not necessary for the
individual transaction to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, so
long as the type of activity at issue has the requisite substantial effect:
Congress' Commerce Clause power "may be exercised in individual
cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce" if
in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent "a
general practice .. . subject to federal control." Only that general
82
practice need bear on interstate commerce in a substantial way.
75. "Commerce" is defined as "commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or
in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or
between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation.
9 U.S.C.

§ 1.
76. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 74 (1995).
77. See id. at 278.
78. See Cusimano v. Schnurr, 26 N.Y.3d 391, 399, (N.Y. 2015) (finding an agreement
concerning commercial real estate to have sufficient effect on interstate commerce); see also
Crespo v. Kreisel Co., Inc., 657 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding that "under
no stretch of the term can it be said that the operation of a single apartment building in
Manhattan can be said to affect or involve interstate commerce.").
79. ImClone Sys. Inc. v. Waksal, 802 N.Y.S.2d 653, 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (finding that
[t]
he parties' residence and negotiation of the agreement in New York... [did] not require the
conclusion that the FAA [did] not govern[,]" due to other elements of the transaction that
affected interstate commerce).
80. See Diamond Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v. 55 Liberty Owners Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 247, 252
(N.Y. 2005) (finding the dispute subject to the FAA because the underlying transaction affected
interstate commerce, because "[n]umerous out-of-state entities were involved" in the project
and because various materials, equipment, and services for the contract were obtained from
different states); see also ImClone Sys. Inc., 802 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (although parties reside in the
same state and negotiated the contract in New York, plaintiff's status as federally regulated, with
products distributed nationally, investors across the country, and a restrictive covenant limiting
plaintiffs activities throughout the U.S., was sufficient to find that parties' transaction involved
interstate commerce).
81. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003).
82. Id. at 56 57 (citations omitted).
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Given the Court's broad interpretation of interstate commerce, the majority
of arbitrations will involve some aspect of interstate commerce sufficient to
trigger the applicability of the FAA.83
The next question under the analysis is: which chapter of the FAA applies?
Chapter 1 of the FAA alone applies to agreements to arbitrate that result in a
"domestic award."84 A "domestic award" is an award issued in New York
where the parties are citizens of the United States or the relationship
between the parties "involves [neither] property located abroad, [nor]
envisages performance ... abroad, [n]or has some other reasonable relation
with one or more foreign states."' 5 Where, however, parties have chosen
New York as the seat of their arbitration and either one or more of the
parties is not a U.S. citizen or if all are U.S. citizens, their relationship
involves property located abroad, envisages performance abroad, or has
some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states, then,
Chapters 286 or 387 of the FAA (and either the New York Convention or
Panama Convention) apply. The resulting award is termed a "nondomestic
award," even though it is issued in the United States.88
An arbitration in New York that falls under Chapters 2 or 3 of the FAA is
also subject to the provisions of Chapter 1 of the FAA "to the extent that
chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention as ratified by
the United States." 89 This is because "[t]he basic understanding of the New
York Convention" and the Panama Convention is that each Contracting
State shall enforce agreements to arbitrate and "recognize arbitral awards as
83. Recent decisions finding the FAA to be inapplicable due to no effect on interstate
commerce include: Kudler v. Truffelman, 941 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (reversing
determination that FAA applied because the parties' medical practice partnership agreement
"did not involve interstate commerce"); Laszlo N. Tauber & Assocs. I, LLC v. Am. Mgmt.
Assoc., 757 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ("The subject lease is for office space in a
commercial building located in Manhattan and does not, by its terms, contemplate or facilitate
any involvement in interstate commerce."); Barclays Capital Inc. v. Leventhal, No. 651527/
2016, 2017 WL 7732816, at *3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. July 25, 2017) (although the FAA governs
arbitration of employment disputes in the securities industry, it does not apply to a dispute over
a former security industry employee's failure to pay promissory note issued by parent bank of
the former employer).
84. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 16 (1947).
85. CBF Industria de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 850 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 2017)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 202).
86. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 208.
87. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301 307.
88. CBF Induistria de Gusa S/A, 850 F.3d at 73. Where both the New York Convention and
Panama Convention would apply, as for example, the United States is a signatory to both, the
Panama Convention formally takes precedence when "a majority of the parties to the
arbitration agreement are citizens of a State or States that have ratified or acceded to the InterAmerican Convention and are member States of the Organization of American States." 9
U.S.C. § 305. That said, the "Inter-American Convention is substantively identical to the New
York Convention..." PDV Sweeny, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co., No. 14-CV-5183 (AJN), 2015
WL 5144023, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2015), affd 670 Fed. App'x 23 (2d Cir. 2016).
89. 9 U.S.C. §§ 208, 307.
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binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
territory where [the arbitration is to be held or] the award is relied upon,
'
under the conditions laid down in the . . . articles [of the Convention]."90
The rules of procedure regarding arbitration conducted in the United States
and the grounds for vacating or modifying an award issued in this country
are found in Chapter 1 of the FAA.
A case in point is LGC Holdings, Inc. v. Julius Klein Diamonds, LLC, where

the court was asked to determine which vacatur standard applied to a
nondomestic award issued in New York and subject to the New York
Convention) 1 In that circumstance, both the New York Convention
grounds and domestic grounds for vacatur apply to such an award.92 In
order to then resolve whether domestic arbitration law meant the FAA or
New York arbitration rules, the court looked to the arbitration agreement. 93
Because the parties' agreement was "silent as to the choice of arbitral law"
and "did not contractually agree to apply New York's vacatur standards to
their arbitration," the court rejected the applicability of New York law and
applied the FAA.94 Thus, as explained below, New York arbitration law can
play a role not just in domestic arbitrations that involve interstate commerce
but also to international arbitrations seated in New York depending on the
wording of the parties' agreement. 95
If the FAA or some other specialized federal statute does not apply, then
all issues of compelling arbitration, what issues are for the court versus the
arbitrator to decide in the first instance, and whether to confirm or vacate an
award rendered in a New York arbitration will necessarily be subject to
Article 75 alone.96
90. TermRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added) (citing New York Convention, art. III).
91. LGC Holdings, Inc. v. Julius Klein Diamonds, LLC, 238 F. Supp. 3d 452, 462 (S.D.N.Y.
2017).
92. See, e.g., Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C. v. Supreme Foodservice GmbH, 495 F.
App'x 149, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2012); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc.,
126 F.3d 15, 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (the New York Convention vacatur standards apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and
enforcement is sought and the Convention also "allow[s] a court in the country under whose
law the arbitration was conducted to apply domestic arbitral law ... to a motion to set aside or
vacate that arbitral award").
93. LGC Holdings, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d at 466.
94. Id.
95. There is one category of arbitral awards subject to the New York or Panama Convention
to which New York arbitration law has no application. When under Chapter 2 or 3 of the FAA,
a party seeks to recognize and enforce in the United States an award issued abroad, a foreign
award in the nomenclature adopted by CBF Inddstria de Gusa S/A, Article 75 plays no role, as
the procedure and standards for recognition are governed exclusively by federal law. 850 F.3d
at 73. The FAA also provides original federal subject matter and removal jurisdiction for a
proceeding to recognize a foreign award, so that as a practical matter, virtually all such
proceedings are litigated in federal court. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205, 302 (1947).
96. The significance of the FAA not applying is that to the extent the New York Legislature
has determined that parties cannot be required to arbitrate certain disputes, that policy
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If a transaction does involve interstate commerce and therefore the
arbitration agreement is subject to the FAA, the question becomes whether
and to what extent New York arbitral rules also apply to the parties'
agreement. The role, if any, to be played by Article 75 in a New York
arbitration that is subject to the FAA is determined by whether the parties
explicitly or implicitly agreed in their contract to be bound by New York's
arbitration law.
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Yr.
Univ. (Volt), the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether state arbitral rules
may coexist with the FAA or are preempted by the federal statute. 97 There,
the California Court of Appeals determined, as a matter of law, that an
agreement that "contained an agreement to arbitrate all disputes between
the parties 'arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof'"
and provided "[t]he Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where
the Project is located" adopted California law not only as the law under
which to construe the agreement but also adopted the state's arbitration
law.98 Under California's arbitration law, the parties' arbitration would be
stayed pending the resolution of certain litigation involving third parties;
whereas under the FAA, no stay would be available and the parties would be
required to arbitrate immediately.99 In light of that difference in result, the
question before the Supreme Court in Volt was whether the FAA
"nonetheless preempted" the parties' deemed agreement to adopt
California's arbitration rules. 100
In finding no preemption, the Supreme Court explained that the "FAA
contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration." 10 Rather, the overarching
determination is not preempted by the federal principle against hostility towards arbitration.
For example, General Business Law § 399-c (GBL 399-c) forbids the inclusion of mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. But where the FAA applies to a particular consumer
contract because the transaction, in fact, affects interstate commerce, courts have held the FAA
to preempt GBL 399-c. See, e.g., Andersen v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 2017 NVL 661188, *8
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2017) (contract for sale of laptop computers where the parties were citizens
of/operated in different states); Marino v. Salzman, 51 Misc. 3d 131(A), at *1, 36 N.Y.S.3d 48
(N.Y. App. Term 2016) (security system and security services contract offered by a multi-state
company); De Oliveira v. Custom Made, 48 Misc. 3d 1204(A), at *3 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Queens Cy.
2015) (custom design product contract offered via the internet connecting parties and artisans
in different states); Schiffer v Slomin's, Inc., 48 Misc.3d 15, 19, 11 N.Y.S.3d 799 (N.Y. App.
Term 2015) (contract for alarm systems offered by a multi-state company).
97. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989) (holding the California Arbitration Act is not preempted by the FAA where parties were
found to have agreed that their arbitration agreement would be governed by California
arbitration law).
98. Id. at 470.
99. Id. at 479.
100. Id. at 476.
101. Id. at 470.
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intent of Congress in adopting the FAA was to have courts "enforce privately
negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with
their terms."102 Because the FAA requires that "arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in [the parties'] agreement,"103 parties to an arbitration
agreement may "[choose] in their agreement to abide by the state rules of
arbitration."104 Thus, although the FAA preempts state laws which mandate
a court forum for resolving disputes the parties had otherwise agreed to
arbitrate, "it does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the
[FAA] itself."105
Instead, courts have found that the application of state arbitral rules that
differ from those provided for in the FAA actually furthers the federal
statute's primary purpose of allowing parties to arbitrate according to their
terms. Where "the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully
consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is
stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward."106
Similarly, with respect to review of a resulting domestic arbitral award, in
Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, although
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA provide the exclusive grounds for vacatur or
enforcement of an arbitral award subject to the FAA irrespective of the
parties' agreement to apply different standards, parties may "contemplate
enforcement under state statutory or common law ... where judicial review
07
of different scope is arguable."
102. Id. at 478 (state law is preempted when federal law expressly preempts state law or reflects
a congressional intent to occupy the entire field, or when the state law actually conflicts with the
federal law). The FAA preempts a state law that invalidates arbitration agreements or imposes
conditions on agreements to arbitrate. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 686 89 (1996) (finding Montana law preempted where it mandated arbitration agreements
to comply with requirements "not applicable to contracts generally"); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 16 (1984) (holding the FAA preempted a California state law that

barred arbitration of certain claims).
103. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475

§ 4).
104. Id. at 472.
105. Id. at 479. Since Volt, no court in New York has found a provision of New York arbitration

(1989) (quoting 9 U.S.C.

law to be preempted by the FAA where the parties were found to have agreed that Article 75
would apply even if applying the FAA alone would result in a contrary decision. See, e.g.,
Manhard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 516 U.S. 811 (1995); Cty. of Nassau,
402 F. App'x at 542; In re Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 202
(N.Y. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., 516 U.S. 811 (1995).
106. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.

107. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 92 (2008). To the extent that
the FAA governs an arbitration agreement, and the parties have not agreed to be bound by New
York arbitration law, it is clear that the FAA "does not permit parties to expand, by their own

agreement, the scope of judicial review beyond that authorized by the Act." Life Receivables
Tr. v. Goshawk Syndicate 102 at Lloyd's, 496, 888 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). See also
In re Mahn v. Major, Lindsey, & Africa LLC, 159 A.D.3d 546 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2018)
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Thus, because the Supreme Court has determined that the overarching
goal of the FAA is to implement the parties' agreement, 108 courts have
allowed parties to incorporate state arbitral rules, such as Article 75, to
govern arbitration proceedings that would otherwise be governed by the
FAA alone.109 Accordingly, when (a) the FAA is applicable to an arbitration
conducted in New York because the transaction affects interstate commerce,
and (b) Article 75 applies because as a matter of state law the parties have
used words in their agreement that have been found to adopt state law, the
FAA and New York law both apply as a technical matter. To reiterate,
agreements specifying that arbitration will be conducted pursuant to state
rules or procedures do not cease being subject to the FAA, but rather the
FAA permits parties to "specify by contract the rules under which .. .
arbitration will be conducted."I0

When a court enforces the terms of an arbitration agreement that
incorporates state law rules, it does so not because the parties have chosen to
be governed by state rather than federal law. Rather, it does so because
federal law requires that the court enforce the terms of the agreement."'
V.

Adoption of New York Arbitration Law

So how, as a matter of New York contract interpretation law, can parties
be found to have agreed-consistent with their freedom to do so under the
FAA-to adopt New York's arbitration law? Article 75 applies in FAAgoverned proceedings in one of two ways: (a) where the parties expressly
(where FAA exclusively applied, court refused to honor the parties' agreement); Mogul Decl.
Ex. A at 4, Mahn v. Major, Lindsey, & Africa LLC, No. 10 Civ. 04239 (S.D.N.Y. July 13,
2010), ECF No. 21-2 (the parties' agreement in the Mahn case was that "[a] party opposing
enforcement of an award may bring a separate action in any court of competent jurisdiction to
set aside or modify the award, where the standard of review will be the same as that applied by
an appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury"). It remains
undecided whether parties who have been found to have agreed to be bound by New York
arbitration law may effectively contract for more searching judicial review of their arbitral
award. With respect to an international award subject to the New York or Panama
Conventions, some scholars have suggested that parties may not use state arbitration law to
expand judicial review for vacating or denying confirmation of a Convention award in the
United States beyond what is prescribed by the FAA. See Maxi Scherer and Linda Silberman,
Limits to Party Autonomy at the Post-Award Stage: Chapter 14 at 469, in LIMITS TO PARTY
AUTONOMY IN INT'L

COM.

ARB.

(Franco Ferrari ed., 2016); NYU School of Law, Public Law

Research Paper No. 16 28 (citing Restatement of the Law (Third), The U.S. Law of
International Commercial Arbitration, Tentative Draft No. 2, § 4 23 at 298 (April 16, 2012)
(approved by AlI at May 2012 meeting); Linda J. Silberman, The Supreme Court's Recent
Perspective on Party Autonomy in Arbitration: What Does It Mean for the ProposedALI Restatement
on InternationalCommercialArbitration? 5 WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 3, 318 19 (2011)).
108. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475
(1989).
109. Id. at 470.
110. Id. at 479.
111. Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2001), rev'd on other
grounds, by Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 576.
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adopt New York's arbitration law in their arbitration provision, or (b) where
they have implicitly done so in their choice-of-law clause, as explained
below.112
A.

EXPRESS INCORPORATION

Parties may explicitly contract for New York's arbitration rules to govern
where the FAA would otherwise apply. Although "[g]enerally, when a
contract contains an arbitration clause, the clause itself does not have a
choice-of-law provision in it," there are exceptions."3 For example, in In re
Rom Reinsurance Mgmt. Co., Inc., (Rom Reinsurance), the parties agreed that

"'the arbitration laws of New York State' shall govern the parties'
arbitration."1 4 In County of Nassau, the agreement stated that "the decision
of the arbitrators will be binding and not subject to appeal, except solely and
exclusively on the grounds set forth in the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules."5 In both cases, the courts held that the quoted language
constituted a clear intention to have the arbitration laws of New York,
including Article 75, govern exclusively.
In Rom Reinsurance, that meant the threshold issue of the statute of
limitations was for the court to resolve under CPLR 7502(b) and 7503(a)
and not for the arbitrator, as would be the case if the FAA governed
exclusively.116 In County of Nassau, that meant confirmation of the award was

governed by New York's standard whether the arbitration award "violates a
strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated
limitation on the arbitrator's power," rather than by the federal "manifest
7
disregard of the law" standard employed by the district court at that time."
112. In some cases, governed by the FAA, courts have accepted that they "may apply state
grounds for vacatur, where they are consistent with the FAA's terms and purposes," but have
done so without any analysis of the agreement to determine whether the parties adopted New
York arbitration law. ACN Dig. Phone Serv., LLC v.Universal Microelectronics Co., Ltd.,
115 A.D.3d 602, 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). See also TA Assocs., L.P. v. Gandy, 993 N.Y.S.2d
646 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2014) (noting that the parties did not dispute that both Article 75 and
the FAA applied to the arbitration). Although in both cases the outcome was the same under
the FAA and Article 75, these decisions do not appear correctly decided in not demanding an
affirmative agreement to have New York arbitration law apply before applying the Article 75
standards.
113. See

ROBERT

L.

HAIG, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS

§ 14:14

(4th ed. 2015).
114. In re Rom Reinsurance Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., Inc., 982 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014).
115. Pet'r's Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Mot. to Vacate, and in Supp. Of Cross-Mot. to Confirm,
Arbitration Award at 8,Cty. of Nassau v. Chase, No. 08 Civ. 0082 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,2008),
ECF No. 20.
116. In re Rom Reinsurance, 982 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
117. Cty. of Nassau, 402 F. App'x at 542 (quotation omitted). See also Moosazadeh v. Cream-OLand Dairy, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 6069 (RLM), 2015 VL 1062184, at *1,*3(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11,
2015) (award subject to FAA nonetheless reviewed under Article 75 standards where parties'
National Arbitration and Mediation (NAM) Dispute Resolution Agreement provided that
"either party is free to confirm the award pursuant to [section] 7502" of New York's CPLR).
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Indeed, in the cases of express adoption of New York's arbitration law in an
agreement otherwise subject to the FAA, the courts have applied New York
law without the FAA's provisions playing any role.
The express invocation of New York arbitration law is plainly sanctioned
by Volt and presents an easy case as a matter of contract interpretation under
New York law. As one judge observed: "It is hard to imagine what the
parties intended when they agreed that the 'arbitration law of New York
State shall govern such arbitration' if they did not intend to have the CPLR
apply to petitions to review arbitration awards." '"s But as demonstrated in
the next section, parties can find themselves bound by Article 75 even
without referring to the CPLR or New York arbitration law in their
contract.
B.

IMPLICIT ADOPTION

In the typical contract, a separate clause from the arbitration provision
states the choice of law governing the contract as a whole. Because
the FAA does not require that its own rules be applied when parties
have affirmatively agreed to arbitrate under a different set of rules[,]
[t]his policy has given rise to uncertainty as courts attempt to determine
whether parties to a contract intended to incorporate specific state laws
respecting arbitration into their agreement simply by adopting a
standard choice of law clause in the contract." 9
The question is whether as a matter of state contract law does the choice-oflaw clause adopt state procedural law or only substantive law (assuming the
distinction between the two is clear)?120
As noted above, in Volt, the California court ruled that a clause providing
that the agreement "shall be governed by [California law]" effectively
adopted California's arbitration law in displacement of the FAA's
standards.121
In New York, the Court of Appeals has also considered whether parties
have agreed to adopt the provisions of Article 75 through the wording of the
stand-alone choice-of-law clause in their contract. 122 In Luckie, the New
York Court of Appeals, without dissent, held that a choice-of-law provision
stating that "[t]his agreement and its enforcement shall be governed by the
laws of the State of New York" manifested not just that New York law would
118. Harper Ins. Ltd. v. Century Indem. Co., 819 F. Supp. 2d 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
119. HMG, supra note 113.
120. Because the issue is to what extent state procedural law is incorporated via a choice-of-law

clause, one could in theory draft a choice-of-law clause to read that the agreement is "governed
by the substantive law of the state of X." This, however, is not a formulation often seen in the

treatises or case law.
121. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470
(1989).
122. In re Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 197 (N.Y. 1995), cert.
denied sub nom., 516 U.S. 811 (1995).
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provide the substantive law under which the contract would be interpreted,
but also "that the parties intended that New York law govern the
arbitration," separately provided for in the agreement. 123 In Luckie, this
holding meant that Article 75 applied, specifically CPLR 7502(b) and
7503(b), which delegate statute of limitations questions to the court, to
resolve and authorize a stay of arbitration pending that judicial
determination, rather than delegating limitations to the arbitrator in the first
instance, as does the FAA.124 The Court further ruled that under Volt,
applying New York's rule on the resolution of limitations defenses was not
preempted by the FAA because the application of "this State's body of
arbitration law ... is not inimical to the policies of the FAA."125 In other
words, unless a state law rule of arbitration agreed to by the parties is
inimical to the policies of the FAA, the FAA will not preempt it.
By contrast, in Matter of Diamond Waterproofing Sys., Inc., the unanimous
court held that a choice-of-law provision stating that the agreement "shall be
governed by the law of [New York]" did not imply an intent to be bound by
Article 75, "because the contract's choice-of-law provision does not provide
that New York law shall govern the enforcement of the parties'
'
agreement."126
The New York Court of Appeals so ruled even though this
language was found by the California courts in Volt to adopt California's
arbitration law, a state law determination to which the U.S. Supreme Court
deferred.
More recently, in N..R. Assocs. v. Tausend (N..R. Assocs.), the New York
Court of Appeals adhered to its position that where the parties' choice-oflaw clause provides their agreement "shall be governed by, and construed in
accordance with, the laws and decisions of the State of New York," such
clause "does not include the critical 'enforcement' language" and thus "the

123. Id. at 198, 202 03 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 202. The limitations issue courts are empowered to resolve under CPLR 7502(b) is
compliance with statutory limitations periods, as opposed to deadlines established by contract
for taking action or disputing claims. Id. Nonetheless, as Luckie itself illustrates, whether a
claim is timely under CPLR Article 2 can, in turn, depend on the court resolving such
potentially fact-intensive questions under CPLR 202 as where the claim accrued and applying
the discovery and tolling rules of New York and potentially a foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 206 07.
125. Id. at 205.
126. In re Diamond Waterproofing Sys., 4 N.Y.3d at 250. The federal courts in New York have
followed Diamond Waterproofing on the issue of whether a choice-of-law clause incorporated
New York's arbitration law. See, e.g., CRC Inc. v. Comput. Scis. Corp., No. 10 Civ. 4981(HB),
2010 VL 4058152, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010) ("In the absence of 'critical language
concerning enforcement,' however, the FAA's vacatur rules apply" to the exclusion of the
provisions of the CPLR); Penrod Mgmt. Grp. v. Stewart's Mobile Concepts, Ltd., No. 07 Civ.
10649(JGK), 2008 WVL 463720, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2008) ("In this case, the choice of law
provision states only that the Agreement 'shall be construed in accordance with New York
law.' . . . This language is insufficient to find that the parties intended Section 7503(b) [rather
than the FAA] to govern the issue of waiver" of jurisdictional objections to arbitration).
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agreement fails to unequivocally invoke the New York standard" for
incorporating Article 75.127
C.

WHAT IF ARTICLE 75 IS INCORPORATED BY THE CRITICAL
WORD ENFORCEMENT?

Although the specific question in each of Luckie, Diamond Waterproofing,
and N..R. Assocs. was whether the parties intended to adopt the New York
arbitration law rule that statutory time limitations are for the court, not the
arbitrators, to decide, for the following reasons, the cases establish that use
of the "enforced under" or "enforcement governed by" New York law
formulation incorporates all of New York's arbitration law, not just the
provisions of CPLR 7502(b) and 7503(b).
First, if the words "enforced under" New York law serve to adopt CPLR
7502(b) and 7503(b) without mentioning those provisions or the terms
"statutes of limitations" or even "arbitration," it is hard to see how this
talismanic phrase does not also incorporate the rest of New York's
arbitration law, including the multiple other differences from the FAA found
in New York law.
Second, the New York Court of Appeals in Luckie rejected the argument
that Volt authorizes parties to agree only to a state law regime that
temporarily stays arbitration, whereas CPLR 7503(b) could permanently
preclude any arbitration from being pursued if the court finds a claim to be
untimely.128 Rather, the Luckie court read the U.S. Supreme Court as
broadly sanctioning that the Volt parties' agreement incorporated the "entire
body of California's statutory arbitration rules . . . without
circumscription."129
The Luckie opinion similarly imposed no
127. N.J.R. Assocs. v. Tausend, 19 N.Y.3d 597, 602 (N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation omitted).
Lower courts in New York have consistently confirmed that the inclusion of enforcement

language in a choice-of-law provision to an arbitration agreement will invoke New York arbitral
rules, while the exclusion of such critical language will result in an application of the FAA. See,
e.g., Volpe, 2013 NVL 3989040 at * 8 (because the contract's choice-of-law provision "include[d]
the requisite 'enforcement' language," New York law, rather than the FAA, "govern[ed] the
interpretation and determination of prerequisites to arbitration," such as whether plaintiff

waived his right to arbitration by filing a complaint and invoking the jurisdiction of the courts);
Roberts, 2007 NVL 1093487, at *6-7 (finding that the choice-of-law provision, which stated that

the agreement's provisions "shall be enforced according to" New York law "evidences the
parties' intention that New York Law governs the Agreement and its enforcement" and

applying Article 75 to the issue of vacatur of an arbitral award). One Supreme Court case has
come out differently: Joseph Gunnar & Co., LLC v. Bridgeman, 14 Misc. 3d 1238(A), at *4,836
N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2007) (finding that the issue of whether the parties
delegated to the courts or the arbitrator the issue of timeliness was "not a matter of enforcement
but of substantive law" notwithstanding Luckie and Diamond Waterproofing).
128. In re Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 196 (N.Y. 1995), cert.
denied sub nom., 516 U.S. 811 (1995).
129. Id. at 206.
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circumscription on the provisions of New York arbitration law incorporated
when parties agree to have their contract enforced under New York law.130
Third, then Chief Judge Kaye in her separate opinion in Luckie was
explicit on this point. She read the majority as "conclud[ing] that the express
language of the parties' agreements contemplated that the zWhole of New
York arbitration law would apply, and following Volt we give force to the
parties' agreement.'' Writing for herself, ChiefJudge Kaye concurred that
"the parties can fairly be understood to have agreed that all of New York
arbitration law . .. would apply" because the choice-of-law clause provided
that the enforcement of the agreement is governed by New York law.132
Accordingly, just as the express adoption of New York arbitration law in
Rom Reinsurance and County of Nassau incorporates the whole of such law, so

too a choice-of-law clause that makes the enforcement of the parties'
agreement subject to New York law, incorporates all of New York arbitration
law, and not just the provision dealing with statutes of limitations.
That said, most recently, the First Department in a sharply divided threetwo decision in Matter of Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC v. Weiss, ruled that a
choice-of-law provision that the agreement was to be "construed and
enforced" in accordance with New York law nonetheless "did not
unequivocally demonstrate an intent" to be bound by the New York
arbitration law rule (the Garrity rule) that "exclude[s] claims for punitive
33
damages from the consideration of the arbitrators."'1

There are reasons, however, to believe that Flintlock was wrongly decided
and that the Court of Appeals' decisions in Luckie, Diamond Waterproofing,

and N..R. Assocs. should not be read as limited to incorporating only New
York's rule on judicial resolution of statutory limitations defenses.
0 First, the Flintlock majority relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Mastrobuono.134 In Mastrobuono, the Court held-without
the benefit of any New York court decision to which to defer-that a
client agreement reciting merely that "it shall be governed by the laws
of the State of New York" did not clearly evidence an intent to opt out
of the federal default rule that arbitrators may award punitive damages
and replace it with one borrowed from New York law that arbitrators
may not award punitive damages. 135 The Supreme Court determined
130. Id. at 204.
131. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
133. In re Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC v. Weiss, 122 A.D.3d 51, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
134. Id. at 55-56 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995))
135. 514 U.S. at 53. Shortly after Luckie was decided by the New York Court of Appeals and
Mastrobuono was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Second Circuit in Bybyk determined
that Luckie is no longer good law in light of the Mastrobuono decision. 81 F.3d at 1200. The
Bybyk majority erroneously characterizes Luckie as "rel[ying] on the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Mastrobuono, which was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court." Id. The Luckie
court, while citing the Seventh Circuit decision, did not rely on it. 85 N.Y.2d at 195-196, 202.
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono should not undermine Luckie as good law.
Moreover, as noted above, the choice-of-law clause in Mastrobuono did not include the critical
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that the choice-of-law provision evidenced an intent to encompass the
"substantive principles that New York courts would apply, but not to
include special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators." 136 But the
Flintlock majority did not give any consideration to the fact that the
choice-of-law clause before it included the "enforcement" language
137
that was lacking in Mastrobuono.
* Second, the Flintlock majority dismissed the relevance of Diamond
Waterproofing as containing dicta because it did not involve the New
York arbitration rule relating to punitive damages but did not
acknowledge that the New York Court of Appeals, rather than the
U.S. Supreme Court, is the final arbiter on whether contractual
language is sufficiently clear, as a matter of New York law, to
incorporate Article 75.138
* Third, the Flintlock majority did not address Luckie's holding
reaffirmed in Diamond Waterproofing that the "enforcement" language
provided sufficiently clear intent to be bound by New York arbitration
law.139 As the Flintlock dissent noted:
Diamond[Waterproofing] and its progeny make clear that, even if the
FAA applies to an agreement, the parties may still limit the
arbitrator's power by invoking New York law. To do so, however,
the parties must not only make the agreement subject to New York
law, but must also make its "enforcement" subject to New York law.
By using such language, the parties "unequivocally" invoke the
limitations on arbitration under New York State law.140
* Fourth, the First Department's decision in Flintlock was not reviewed
by the Court of Appeals; the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals
term "enforcement," whereas in Luckie it did. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 52; In re Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 203 (N.Y. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., 516 U.S.
811 (1995). After the Bybyk decision, the New York Court of Appeals twice reaffirmed the rule

of Luckie in and N.J.R. Assocs. and Diamond Waterproofing. See 19 N.Y.3d 597; 4 N.Y.3d 247.
136. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 52-53.
137. The relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono and the New

York Court of Appeals' decision in Luckie is interesting. Luckie was decided on February 21,
1995 and noted that Mastrobuono was pending before the Supreme Court. See 85 N.Y.2d at
195-196, 202. The Supreme Court decided Mastrobuono just two weeks later, on March 6,
1995, but without citing Luckie at all. 514 U.S. 52. Given the emphasis in Luckie on the word
"enforcement" which was missing from the choice-of-law clause in Mastrobuono, the outcome in
Mastrobuono appears fully consistent with New York law as construed in Luckie and its progeny.
See id. This is despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not have a New York state court's
interpretation of the choice-of-law clause in Mastrobuono to which to defer, as it did to the

California Court of Appeals' decision in Volt. See 489 U.S. at 479. Mastrobuono came to the
U.S. Supreme Court following an arbitration conducted in Illinois applying New York
substantive law, whose award was confirmed by the federal district court and the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
138. In re Flintlock, 122 A.D.3d at 55.
139. Id. at 51-57.
140. Id. at 63.
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but was dismissed on the motion of the parties before the Court could
rule.141
Thus, although Flintlock engenders some doubt as to precisely what
provisions of New York arbitration law are binding on the parties when they
agree that New York law governs the "enforcement" of their agreement,
absent a decision from the New York Court of Appeals to the contrary,
Luckie continues to reflect the position that the "whole" of New York's
arbitration law applies when the parties have subjected the "enforcement" of
142
their agreement to New York law.
D.

CAN

BOTH SETS OF RULES APPLY SIMULTANEOUSLY?

The judicial decisions on cases that have applied Article 75 to an FAAgoverned arbitration as a result of the choice-of-law clause have involved
conflicts between the provisions of the FAA and Article 75, with the result
that where the parties were found to have adopted New York arbitration law,
the conflicting New York standard prevailed, as permissible under the FAA
as construed in Volt.143 As the Court of Appeals explained in Luckie,
"[u]ndeniably, in the absence of an explicit choice of law provision,
governing Federal law would have precluded the courts in the appeals before
us from addressing the Statute of Limitations issue or from issuing stays
under our arbitration act."144 But what happens if there is a provision of
Article 75 that arguably does not conflict with any provision of the FAA,
because the FAA simply does not address the issue? What role do the
provisions of Article 75 that do not conflict with the FAA play? May parties
rely on Article 75 and, if so, only as a result of a choice-of-law clause found
to incorporate Article 75? Or is agreeing to arbitrate in New York alone
sufficient to make applicable all provisions of Article 75 not in conflict with
the FAA?
This issue has arisen with respect to the procedure for moving to vacate or
correct an award issued in New York that is subject to the FAA. As noted
above, Section 12 of the FAA dictates the date by which notice of a motion
to vacate or modify an award must be served but is silent on the filing of
such motion in a court. 145 By contrast, CPLR 7511 (a) addresses the deadline
for filing a motion to vacate or modify.146 The Second Circuit has thus held
that such a motion must be both timely served under the FAA and timely
filed under Article 75 on the theory that because Section 12 addresses only
141. In re Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC v. Weiss, 28 N.E.3d 25 (N.Y. 2015) (dismissing appeal
"upon the ground that the issues presented have become moot").
142. In re Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 208 (N.Y. 1995), cert.
denied sub nom., 516 U.S. 811 (1995).

143. See, e.g., TAAssocs., L.P., 43 Misc.3d 1233(A), at *3(noting that the parties did not dispute
that both Article 75 and the FAA applied to the arbitration); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd.
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 468 (1989).

144. 85 N.Y.2d at 202 (internal citation omitted).
145. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1947).
146. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(a) (McKinney 2018).
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service, "the ninety-day limitations period in C.P.L.R. section 7511 governs
the timeliness of [petitioner's] petition" to vacate. 147 This decision is not
based on any choice-of-law clause in the parties' agreement, but rather on
the fact that Article 75 provides procedural rules (governing arbitrations
conducted and awards issued in New York) on issues not addressed by the
FAA.148

Similarly, when a New York court, state or federal, is being asked to
consider an application for an attachment or preliminary injunction in aid of
an arbitration subject to the FAA, it often looks to CPLR 7502(c) as
providing the standards for granting such relief, again without regard to
whether the parties intended to adopt New York arbitration law through
their arbitration or choice-of-law clause. 49 Indeed, "the New York
Legislature amended CPLR 7502(c) in 2005, making clear that New York
courts can grant interim relief for arbitrations" subject to the New York or
Panama Conventions, which by definition involve arbitration agreements
governed by the FAA.150

VI. What Role is Played by Institutional Arbitration Rules
Selected by the Parties?
The remainder of the Article 75 provisions as to which the FAA is silent
may still serve a role in the sui generis case, particularly if the parties have
agreed to arbitrate, but not under particular Institutional Arbitration Rules,
such as the AAA, JAMS, CPR, etc.' 5 1
But where, as has become commonplace, the parties have agreed to
arbitrate under Institutional Arbitration Rules, those Rules generally address
147. See Hakala v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc., 186 F. App'x 131, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming
dismissal of petition to vacate, because it was filed ninety-one days after petitioner received the
panel's award). In Martin v. Deutsche Bank See., Inc., the same court affirmed the dismissal
where the petitioner filed his petition to vacate timely under CPLR 7511 (a) but failed to serve it
in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 on respondent's counsel within the three months provided
for in FAA § 12. 676 F. App'x 27 (2d Cir. 2017).
148. Hakala, 186 F. App'x at 133.
149. CPLR 7502(c) provides that a court may issue an "order of attachment or for a
preliminary junction in connection with an arbitration.., but only upon the ground that the
award . . . may be rendered ineffectual without such provisional relief. The provisions of
articles 62 and 63 of this chapter shall apply to the application ... except that the sole ground
for the granting of the remedy shall be as stated above." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7502(c). See, e.g., SG
Cowen Sec. Corp. v. Messih, 224 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that Article 63's traditional
equitable criteria must be satisfied in addition to CPLR 7502(c)'s "rendered ineffectual" test in
order to obtain a preliminary injunction); Mishcon de Reya New York LLP v. Grail
Semiconductor, Inc., 2011 VL 6957595, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2011) (applying CPLR
7502(c)'s "rendered ineffectual" test). On the other hand, the Second Circuit has ruled (without
citing to CPLR 7502(c)) that "[tihe standard for such [a preliminary injunction to preserve the
status quo pending arbitration] is the same as for preliminary injunctions generally." Benihana,
Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 2015).
150. HIG, supra note 113, § 61:41.
151. Id. § 61:29.
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most of the issues dealt with in Article 75 that are not addressed by the FAA,
including the following: the selection of an arbitrator,12 the conduct of the
arbitration, 1 3 whether the arbitrator must swear an oath, 1 4 the time for
issuance of the award,- s the method of delivering the award,156 and whether
the award must be affirmed by the arbitrator.5r
Generally, the incorporation of Institutional Arbitration Rules into
parties' contracts has long been honored and enforced by the courts.
Institutional Arbitration Rules have played a role most often with respect to
offering evidence of the parties' intent with respect to who decides in the
first instance-as between the arbitrators or the court-whether a dispute is
arbitrable or whether an agreement containing an arbitration clause is valid
and binding on the parties.158 Courts rely on Institutional Arbitration Rules
152. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7504 (McKinney 2018) ("[clourt appointment of arbitrator"),
with AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-12 R-14.
153. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7506(b)-(e) (mandating at least eight days' notice of any
hearing; conferring on arbitrator right to "adjourn or postpone" a hearing; entitling parties to
submit "evidence and to cross-examine witnesses"; recognizing right of a party to be
represented by counsel; and requiring all panel members to conduct the hearing, but award may
be issued by a majority), with AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-20, R-26, R-32(a), R-44(a).
154. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7506(a), (f) (requiring an arbitrator to be sworn to "decide the
controversy faithfully and fairly," subject to written waiver or continued participation in "the
arbitration without objection"), with AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-27 ("Before
proceeding with the first hearing, each arbitrator may take an oath of office and, if required by
law, shall do so.").
155. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7507 (court may fix time for award to be made), with AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules R-45.
156. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7507 (arbitrator shall deliver award to each party as specified in
their agreement or else "personally or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested"),
with AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-49 ("Parties shall accept as notice and delivery of
the award the placing of the award or a true copy thereof in the mail addressed to the parties or
their representatives at their last known addresses, personal or electronic service of the award,
or the filing of the award in any other manner that is permitted by law."); ICDR International
Arbitration Rules arts. 30(4) (5) ("The award shall be communicated to the parties by the
Administrator." "If applicable law requires an award to be filed or registered, the tribunal shall
cause such requirement to be satisfied. It is the responsibility of the parties to bring such
requirements or any other procedural requirements of the place of arbitration to the attention
of the tribunal.").
157. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7507 ("award shall be in writing, signed and affirmed by the
arbitrator"), with AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-46 ("Any award shall be in writing and
signed by a majority of the arbitrators. It shall be executed in the form and manner required by
law.").
158. Under First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, gateway questions of arbitrability are reserved
for the court, unless there is "clear and unmistakable evidence" of the parties' intent for these
issues to be resolved by the arbitrator. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
945 (1995). Courts have uniformly found that an agreement to arbitrate under Institutional
Arbitration Rules constituted "clear and unmistakable evidence" of the parties' delegation to an
arbitrator. See, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol. Co., Ltd., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005)
("We have held that when, as here, parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an
arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable
evidence of the parties' intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator."); see also Life Receivables
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that uniformly delegate that determination to the arbitrator. 59 Similarly,
courts will defer to Institutional Arbitration Rules agreed to by the parties
rather than inject themselves on such issues as arbitrator selection or
challenges to arbitrators on grounds of conflicts or partiality.
In turn, the Institutional Arbitration Rules generally and not surprisingly
defer to the requirements of "applicable law"; for example, several of the
AAA Commercial Rules of Arbitration establish default principles that are
subject to such caveats as "if required by law," "to the extent the law allows,"
"unless the law provides to the contrary," or "unless such choice is
prohibited by applicable law."160 The JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration
Trust v. Goshawk Syndicate 102 at Lloyd's, 66 A.D. 3d 495, 495 (1st Dep't 2009) ("Although
the question of arbitrability is generally an issue for judicial determination, when the parties'
agreement specifically incorporates by reference the AAA rules, . . .courts will 'leave the
question of arbitrability to the arbitrators.' (citation omitted)), ajfd, 901 N.Y.S.2d 133 (2010).
On January 8,2019, the Supreme Court which has never addressed whether the incorporation
of Institutional Arbitration Rules constitute such "clear and unmistakable evidence" remanded
to the Fifth Circuit to determine whether an arbitration agreement adopting the AAA Rules
(which provide, like most Institutional Arbitration Rules, that the arbitrator has the power to
determine her own jurisdiction) establishes "clear and unmistakable evidence" that the parties
intended to arbitrate arbitrability. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 585 U.S.
(2019) (slip op., at 8). The ALI's draft Restatement of the U.S. Law of International
Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration has taken the position that the incorporation of
institutional arbitral rules does not constitute "clear and unmistakable evidence" of parties'
intent to arbitrate arbitrability. Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial and
Investor-State Arbitration § 2-8 reporter's note b(iii) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2015).
159. See, e.g., AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-7(a) (b) ("The arbitrator shall have the
power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the
existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or
counterclaim"; "The arbitrator shall have the power to determine the existence or validity of a
contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part."); JAMS Arbitration Rule 11(b)
("Jurisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including disputes over the formation, existence,
validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which Arbitration is sought, and who
are proper Parties to the Arbitration, shall be submitted to and ruled on by the Arbitrator. The
Arbitrator has the authority to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability issues as a preliminary
matter."); CPR Administered Arbitration Rules 8.1 8.2 ("The Tribunal shall have the power to
hear and determine challenges to its jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the
existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement"; "The Tribunal shall have the power to
determine the existence, scope or validity of the contract of which an arbitration clause forms a
part."); ICC 2017 Arbitration Rules arts. 6(3) 6(9) (allocating responsibility for determining
jurisdiction between the tribunal and the ICC Court); ICDR 2014 International Arbitration
Rules arts. 19(1) (2) ("The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration
agreement(s), or with respect to whether all of the claims, counterclaims, and setoffs made in
the arbitration may be determined in a single arbitration"; "The tribunal shall have the power to
determine the existence or validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part.").
160. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-11(b), R-18(a)(iii), R-23(e), R-25 R-27, R-31, R44(a), R-45, R-46(a), R-49, R-57(a). The ICDR is the AAA's international division, whose
International Arbitration Rules apply when the parties have agreed to arbitrate under them or
"have provided for arbitration of an international dispute by the [ICDR] or the [AAA] without
designating particular rules." ICDR International Arbitration Rules art. 1(1). The ICDR's
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Rules & Procedures similarly provides: "If any of these Rules, or
modification of these Rules agreed to by the Parties, is determined to be in
conflict with a provision of applicable law, the provision of law will govern
over the Rule in conflict, and no other Rule will be affected.161 The CPR
Arbitration Rules (Administered and Non-Administered) offer a slightly
different default rule in that the CPR Rules "shall govern the arbitration
except that where any of these [Rules] is in conflict with a mandatory
provision of applicable arbitration law, that provision of law shall prevail."162
In contrast, the ICC Rules by their terms do not defer to local applicable
law, as these rules are intended to apply to arbitrations around the world and
not just in the United States.163

Because the FAA is silent with respect to arbitrator oaths, the right to be
represented by counsel, and the method of delivery of an award, for example,
the only "law to the contrary" to which Institutional Arbitration Rules defer
is state arbitration law such as Article 75. Thus, for example, AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rule R-27 provides that "[b]efore proceeding with
the first hearing, each arbitrator may take an oath of office, and, if required
by law, shall do SO."164 In an arbitration in New York under the AAA's
Commercial Arbitration Rules, the arbitrator's oath is mandatory because
CPLR 7506(a) requires an oath.165
International Arbitration Rules retain the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules' deference to
local applicable law. See, e.g., ICDR International Arbitration Rules arts. 30(5), 37(1).
161. JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, Rule 4 (2014).
162. 2013 CPR Administered Arbitration Rules, Rule 1.2 (effective July 1, 2013); see 2018 CPR
Non-Administered Arbitration Rules, Rule 1.2 (effective March 1, 2018). The ICDR
International Arbitration Rules contains a similar provision that reads as follows: "These Rules
govern the arbitration, except that, where any such rule is in conflict with any provision of the
law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall
prevail." ICDR International Arbitration Rules art. 1(2).
163. See ICC Arbitral Rules art. 19 ("The proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be
governed by the Rules and, where the Rules are silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing
them, the arbitral tribunal may settle on, whether or not reference is thereby made to the rules of
procedure of a national law to be applied to the arbitration.") (emphasis added).
164. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-27.
165. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7506(a) (McKinney 2018). When Institutional Arbitration Rules do not,
by their terms, defer to "applicable law," the adoption of such Rules into an arbitration
agreement can further complicate the analysis of what law governs where New York and federal
arbitration law diverge. For example, AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules authorize arbitrators
to award "any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope
of the agreement." AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-47(a). In considering the issue of the
availability of punitive damages in Flintlock, the First Department noted that the parties had
agreed to arbitrate under AAA Rules which authorize the award of "any remedy which [is] just
and equitable and within the scope of the agreement," suggesting that this agreement further
reinforced the majority's holding that the parties' choice-of-law clause was insufficient (despite
Luckie) to adopt New York's Garrityrule and override the authority of the arbitrators under the
FAA to award punitive damages. In re Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC v. Weiss, 122 A.D.3d 51,
54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules R-47(a)). By contrast the ICDR's International Arbitration Rules contain
both a default rule against the award of punitive damages specifically and a prohibition generally
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Accordingly, given the number of differences between New York
arbitration law under Article 75 and federal law under the FAA, parties and
practitioners need to be aware of the ways in which a choice of law clause, an
agreement to arbitrate, and any Institutional Arbitration Rules chosen to
govern the arbitration interact with one another to produce different results.
The take-away from this review of those differences and the case law is that
it is best to make explicit in the parties' agreement what law governs what
issues when electing to arbitrate in New York.
The New York Legislature and its courts encourage the adoption of New
York law to govern agreements involving at least $250,000 by enforcing
agreements to do so "whether or not such contract, agreement or
undertaking bears a reasonable relation to this state." 166 As to how such a
choice-of-law clause should read, most sources encourage inclusion of
"enforcement" or "enforced under" language in such clauses. Effective in
2018, the New York County Supreme Court Commercial Division adopted
the following model clause recommended for inclusion in contracts to be
governed by New York law: "THIS AGREEMENT AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT,AND ANY CONTROVERSY ARISING OUT OF OR
RELATING TO THE MAKING OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
AGREEMENT, SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
WITHOUT REGARD TO NEW YORK'S PRINCIPLES OF
7
CONFLICTS OF LAW."16
In addition, a number of treatises and practice guides recommend choiceof-law clauses that include not just interpretation but "enforcement" under
New York law, even if they do not offer an affirmative justification for
against the tribunal deciding a dispute "as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono unless the
parties have expressly authorized it to do so." ICDR International Arbitration Rules art. 31(3).
"Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressly waive and forego any right to punitive,

exemplary, or similar damages unless any applicable law(s) requires that compensatory damages
be increased in a specified manner." ICDR International Arbitration Rules art. 31(5).
166. N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-1401(1) (McKinney 2018).
167. Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, AO/204/17 (Oct.
26, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). In both IRB-Brasil Resseguros,
S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A and Ministers &Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow, the New York Court
of Appeals held that choice-of-law clauses that do not include a carve-out for application of
New York's conflicts of laws principles still require application of New York's substantive law
without any consideration of common law or statutory choice-of-law rules. Ministers &
Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow, 26 N.Y.3d 466, 468 (N.Y. 2015); IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A.
v. Inepar Invs., S.A., 20 N.Y.3d 310, 315 16 (N.Y. 2012). Despite the clarity of two decisions
by the highest court in New York that such language is not required and serves no purpose,
practitioners still include the "without regard to New York's principles of conflicts of law"
carve-out as a matter of habit and as belt and suspenders. It should also be noted that the
highest court of each state has not yet decided this question such that when choosing state law
other than New York, the carve-out may in fact be necessary to avoid renvoi and to assure
application of the substantive law of the chosen jurisdiction.
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including "enforcement" within the choice-of-law clause (other than with
respect to its potential consequences in cases where the parties have also
elected to arbitrate their disputes in New York).168
Accordingly, while one could consider omitting the word "enforcement"
or "enforced" from the choice-of-law clause in a contract that provides for
arbitration in New York, given the ubiquity of choice-of-law clause models
that include those terms, and given the ability to eliminate any ambiguity via
the drafting of the arbitration clause, it is critical that practitioners reviewing
agreements make an explicit election as to the role intended to be played by
New York arbitration law. Hence, one leading text provides the following
suggestion concerning the drafting of an arbitration clause: "parties . . .
should ... make clear whether they intend that the FAA or the arbitration
law of the choice of law state should apply." 169 Authors also offer suggestions
to parties on how to draft contracts to achieve such clarity.'70
168. See, e.g., HAIG, supra note 113, § 14:18 (a choice-of-law clause with the "enforcement"
language "is designed to insure that, should any conflicts arise under the parties' contract, a
court would apply the substantive law of New York to the dispute, but would not first look to
New York's conflicts of law rules. The clause is also designed to allow questions of timeliness of
a claim to be determined by a court and not an arbitrator."); TINA L. STARK, NEGOTIATING
AND DRAFTING CONTRACT BOILERPLATE, § 6.02 [3] [G], at 126 (2003) (noting that by adding
"enforcement" to a choice-of-law clause, a state's arbitration rules will apply to the arbitration
proceedings and citing Luckie). Indeed, it is not clear what adding "enforcement" or "enforced
under" to a New York choice-of-law clause achieves where the parties litigate their disputes in a
New York court. In Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. and IRB-Brasil, the addition of the
word "enforcement" was not necessary to the holdings that a clause that recited the agreement
"shall be governed by New York law" "obviates the application of both common-law conflictof-laws principles and statutory choice-of-law directives" and adopts New York substantive law
full stop. Ministers & Missionaries, 26 N.Y.3d at 468; IRB-Brasil, 20 N.Y.3d at 315 16. In
2138747 Ontario, Inc. v. Samsung C & T Corp., 144 A.D.3d 122, 147 (1st Dep't 2016) the
Appellate Division held that the word "enforced" in a choice-of-law clause "should be
interpreted as reflecting the parties' intent to apply both the substantive and procedural law of
New York State to their disputes." New York's "procedural law" includes its statutes of
limitations because "they are deemed 'as pertaining to the remedy rather than the right."' Id.
at 126 (citation omitted). On further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed that New
York's statutes of limitation include its borrowing statute, N.Y. CPLR § 202, which requires a
claim also to be timely under a foreign jurisdiction's statute of limitations if the cause of action
accrued there. 103 N.E.3d 774, 776 (N.Y. 2018). The defendant argued that by agreeing that
its contract would be "'enforced"' according to New York law, the parties agreed that only New
York's statute of limitations applies. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument, concluding
"that the mere addition of the word 'enforced' to the NDA's choice-of-law provision does not
demonstrate the intent of the contracting parties to apply solely New York's six-year statute of
limitations in CPLR 213(2) to the exclusion of CPLR 202." Id. at 778. A fortiori, had the
choice-of-law clause omitted the critical "enforcement" language, there is no doubt the
borrowing statute would have applied, as the New York courts have applied it and thus
considered the applicability of a foreign forum's shorter limitations period where there was no
choice-of-law clause or without analysis of the choice-of-law clause. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N.
Am. v. ABB Power Generation, Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 180, 185 (N.Y. 1997).
169. HAIG, supra note 113, § 14:14.
170. See PAL LD. FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 219
(2d ed. 2007); see also HAIG, supra note 113, § 14:14.
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But how do parties entering into a transaction involving interstate
commerce know whether they "wish" to have their arbitration agreement
and any arbitration in New York "governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
•.. to the exclusion of state law inconsistent therewith," or "governed by the
provisions of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rule?"' 171 In advance of
disputes arising, any attempt to make a reasoned assessment as to which
regime is more advantageous would require the drafter to know whether,
based on the commercial relationship, her client is likely to be the claimant
or the respondent, whether there is a likelihood of assertion of even arguably
time-barred claims, whether punitive damages are a possibility, whether
irrationality versus manifest disregard is a more favorable vacatur standard,
and any number of other unknown and unknowable considerations. All one
does know is that it is strongly advisable to make a conscious choice by
drafting the choice-of-law clause and/or the arbitration clause so as to
eliminate the risk-for better or for worse-of litigation over the applicable
arbitration law (FAA or Article 75) and the unpredictability, additional
expense, and delay that such litigation may engender.
To the extent the parties have agreed not only to arbitration in the abstract
but arbitration under Institutional Arbitration Rules, as is often
recommended, 1 2 the most internally consistent position to take is to specify
in contracts implicating interstate or cross-border commerce that the
arbitration agreement and any arbitration "shall be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act ... to the exclusion of state law inconsistent therewith."'13
This is because the Institutional Arbitration Rules universally give the
arbitrators the greatest autonomy to determine their own jurisdiction, how
the proceedings are to be conducted, and what relief to award. In this
respect, the Institutional Arbitration Rules are aligned with the FAA as
construed by the courts in minimizing judicial interference with the
arbitration and the resulting award. Accordingly, agreement to Institutional
Arbitration Rules is most consistent with agreement to have the FAA govern
over any conflicting New York arbitration law rule.
On the other hand, to the extent a party anticipates some benefit from
having the arbitration governed by Article 75 and being able to seek court
intervention more readily, then one would be less likely to agree to arbitrate
171.

FRIEDLAND,

supra note 170, at 219.

172. See id. at 1-2 (offering model clauses for various Institutional Arbitration Rules); THOMAS
J.
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reference").

173. FRIEDLAND, supra note 170, at 219. Although the language "to the exclusion of state law
inconsistent therewith" may appear to constitute unnecessary surplusage, its omission may give
rise to the inference that the parties intended to eschew even those provisions in Article 75 as to
which the FAA is silent, such as, for example, the judicial authority under CPLR 7502(c) to
enter pre-award attachments or injunctions, or the CPLR 7506(a) requirement of an arbitrator
oath. See id.
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under Institutional Arbitration Rules. 174 In the circumstance of arbitration
under no set of agreed rules, specifying that the arbitration is to be
"governed by the provisions of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rule"
may make sense in a specific case in that Article 75 will supply some of those
rules.
The one combination that does not seem logical in a contract involving
interstate or cross-border commerce is an agreement to arbitrate under
Institutional Arbitration Rules, while having the arbitration agreement and
arbitration explicitly governed by Article 75. This is because the primary
reasons for wanting a New York arbitration to be subject to all of Article 75
(e.g., avoidance of an award of punitive damages and/or attorneys' fees) may
be undermined by the incorporation of contradictory Institutional
Arbitration Rules. Moreover, the incorporation of these conflicting rules
has a high likelihood of creating uncertainty as to how a tribunal would rule.

174. In Rom Reinsurance and County of Nassau, when the parties explicitly agreed their
arbitrations would be governed by New York law, they do not appear to have also chosen to
arbitrate under any Institutional Arbitration Rules.
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